Can Procedure Take?: The Judicial Takings
Doctrine and Court Procedure
Rebecca Hansen†
In considering the value of the judicial takings doctrine, this Comment argues that we should look to a new area of law: procedure. Courts often have the authority to set procedure, and they use this authority for substantive ends. This
Comment argues that applying the Takings Clause to procedure demonstrates the
value of the judicial takings doctrine. It argues that the Takings Clause, rather
than the Due Process Clause, is the appropriate framework for certain forms of
procedure. Under the Takings Clause, we can recognize the judiciary’s authority to
use procedure for substantive ends while also offering “just compensation” to those
unduly affected.
In contending with the practical effects of “judicial-procedure takings,” this
Comment argues that we can supplement the existing takings framework in two
ways. First, we can look to intent: where the government intends to single out a
particular set of property owners to bear a public burden, that should weigh in favor of finding a taking. Second, we can refine our analysis by focusing on whether
the act has an element of aggregation. Where the court has combined discrete elements to create a result that is greater than the sum of its parts, that too should
weigh in favor of a taking. By supplementing the existing test, we can better
identify procedures that are functionally equivalent to traditional takings—
without swallowing up the courts in the process.
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INTRODUCTION
“[I]f regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”
– Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Pennsylvania
Coal v. Mahon1
In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, several state legislatures and executives limited the circumstances in which landlords could evict their tenants.2 Predictably, many of these moratoria were met with challenges under the Fifth Amendment’s
Takings Clause, which prohibits the government from taking
private property for public use without just compensation.3
These challenges have been largely unsuccessful.4
In practice, however, many of the most stringent limits on
landlords’ ability to evict tenants came not from the executive or
legislative branches but from the judicial branch. Many state
courts suspended eviction proceedings entirely, meaning that
landlords were unable, on a practical level, to evict anyone.5
These suspensions often limited evictions more broadly and for a
longer period of time than executive or legislative eviction moratoria. In New York, for instance, former governor Andrew Cuomo
suspended evictions for nonpayment of rent only for tenants
“eligible for unemployment insurance or benefits under state or
federal law or otherwise facing financial hardship due to the

1

260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
See Ann O’Connell, Emergency Bans on Evictions and Other Tenant Protections
Related to Coronavirus, NOLO (July 22, 2020), https://perma.cc/7CDS-ZE9U.
3
See U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also, e.g., Elmsford Apartment Assocs., LLC v.
Cuomo, 469 F. Supp. 3d 148, 162–68 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
4
See, e.g., Elmsford Apartment Assocs., 469 F. Supp. 3d at 162–68 (holding that
the New York governor’s eviction moratorium was not a taking).
5
See O’Connell, supra note 2.
2
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COVID-19 pandemic.”6 That order was set to expire on August
19, 2020.7 In an administrative order, New York’s Chief
Administrative Judge8 clarified that, while landlords were allowed to file new eviction petitions, all eviction matters were
suspended and could not proceed to trial.9 In short, the administrative order limited the ability of landlords to evict any of their
tenants and, unlike the governor’s order, had no definite end
date. As in most other states, this suspension was part of a larger effort to postpone nonessential court proceedings to protect
the public and the court staff.10
In at least one state, however, the judiciary adopted these
limits based on their broader concerns about public policy. In
California, the Judicial Council—the rulemaking body within
California’s judicial branch—issued Emergency Rule 1, addressing the eviction process.11 The rule, among other limits, forbade
state courts from issuing summonses in eviction cases, unless
the action was necessary to protect public health and safety.12
The prohibition originally was to remain in effect until ninety
days after the state of emergency was lifted, or until the rule
was amended or repealed.13 In proposing this rule, the Judicial

6

N.Y. Exec. Order No. 202.28, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 8.202 (2020).
See id.
8
The terminology might be confusing here, given the use of the term “administrative judge” at the federal level. In New York, the Chief Administrative Judge is a member of the judicial branch tasked with the administration of the New York court system.
See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 28. This is distinct from federal administrative judges, who
are members of the executive branch.
9
See Procedure for Addressing Residential and Commercial Eviction Proceedings,
AO/127/20 (June 18, 2020), https://perma.cc/RKH2-H56Z.
10 See, e.g., Memorandum from Chief Admin. Judge Lawrence K. Marks (Mar. 15,
2020), https://perma.cc/W8AL-RJRE; State Courts Take Steps to Protect the Public from
the Coronavirus, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS. (Mar. 18, 2020), https://perma.cc/VG86
-C3RR.
11 CAL. RULES OF CT., app. I, emergency r. 1. Under California’s Constitution, the
Judicial Council has the authority to “adopt rules for court administration, practice and
procedure,” so long as they are not inconsistent with any statute. CAL. CONST. art. VI,
§ 6(d). In response to the pandemic, the governor of California issued an executive order
giving the Judicial Council unprecedented authority to promulgate rules of civil and criminal procedure. The Executive Order provided that, if any rule adopted by the Judicial
Council could be inconsistent with existing statutes, those statutes were suspended to
the extent they conflicted with the proposed rule. See Cal. Exec. Order No. N-38-20, 3
(Mar. 27, 2020), https://perma.cc/Q9VM-XZEL.
12 CAL. RULES OF CT., app. I, emergency r. 1(b).
13 See JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL., REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL, ITEM NO. 20-141
at 8 (Apr. 4, 2020) [hereinafter REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL],
https://perma.cc/8X2Q-NWCJ. Again, this was a broader limit than California’s existing
Executive Order, which forbade evictions for only those experiencing documented,
7
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Council observed that pursuing evictions during the pandemic
was “particularly problematic” for two reasons.14 First, eviction
cases “require very fast legal responses (within five days) from
defendants who are often self-represented and at a time when
court self-help centers and legal aid services are not readily
available.”15 Second, “when involving residential property, they
threaten to remove people from the very homes they have been
instructed to remain in.”16
While the Judicial Council noted that an existing executive
order limited some evictions, it said that the executive order
could not “by itself provide sufficient assistance to tenants and
courts to avert this crisis.”17 Emergency Rule 1 was therefore
necessary to protect litigants and court staff as well as to “implement the goals of the executive order.”18 Following the enactment of Emergency Rule 1, California state legislators asked the
Judicial Council to extend the rule because of delays in passing
their own tenant protections.19
Landlords affected by the order later sued, alleging that the
Judicial Council “usurped the [state] Legislature’s core functions
in violation of the separation-of-powers guarantee” in California’s
state Constitution.20 The complaint argued that Emergency
Rule 1 was a “classic policy decision” within the domain of the
state legislature, not the Judicial Council.21 Neither the complaint nor any other lawsuit alleged that Emergency Rule 1 was
a taking.
While legislative and executive actions are typical fodder for
takings challenges, the Takings Clause was long seen as inapplicable to certain judicial actions. Contrary to this long-standing
belief, a plurality of the Supreme Court opined in Stop the Beach

COVID-related financial hardships. Cal. Exec. Order No. N-37-20, 1–2 (Mar. 27, 2020),
https://perma.cc/5TJP-M4QP. The rule was subsequently amended by the Judicial Council
to sunset on September 1, 2020. JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL., CIRCULATING ORDER
MEMORANDUM TO THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL, CIRCULATING ORDER NO. CO-20-13 at 7 (Aug.
11, 2020), https://perma.cc/9BDM-82JG.
14 REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL, supra note 13, at 7.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Melody Gutierrez, California Legislative Leaders Ask Courts to Keep Coronavirus
Eviction Ban in Place, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2020), https://perma.cc/D7DV-SCN2.
20 Verified Petition for Peremptory Writ of Mandate at 9, Christensen v. Cal. Jud.
Council, No. BCV-20-101361 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 15, 2020), https://perma.cc/6TTB-9SG7.
21 Id. at 10.
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Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental
Protection22 that the judiciary was also subject to the Takings
Clause. However, the Court considered only whether changes to
a state’s common law of property could constitute a taking. It
did not consider whether changes to court procedure—such as
Emergency Rule 1—could as well.23
Emergency Rule 1 is just one example of the ways in which
judicial changes to court procedure could conceivably result in a
taking. Procedure is “the judicial process for enforcing rights and
duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering
remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them.”24 Put
another way, procedure is focused primarily on courts’ own internal processes, rather than substantive law.25 But the Supreme
Court has repeatedly acknowledged that “most procedural rules”
affect a “litigant’s substantive rights,”26 often intentionally. The
Court has explained, “Pleading standards, for example, often
embody policy preferences about the types of claims that should
succeed—as do rules governing summary judgment, pretrial discovery, and the admissibility of certain evidence.”27
This Comment explores two related questions: Should the
Takings Clause apply to procedure promulgated by the judicial
branch? And, if it does, when should that procedure constitute a
taking?
Part I of this Comment first offers some background into the
doctrine of regulatory takings. It then offers a normative justification for takings. It suggests that the Takings Clause is the
appropriate framework for legitimate—perhaps even normatively desirable—government actions that unduly burden a specific
subset of property owners. In those limited cases, application of
the Takings Clause spreads the cost of desirable regulations
across society by compensating burdened property owners.
Part I then offers insight into Stop the Beach and the extension
of the Takings Clause to the judiciary.
Parts II and III focus on the question of whether the Takings
Clause should apply to court procedure. Part II argues that
22

560 U.S. 702 (2010).
Id. at 714.
24 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P. A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 407
(2010) (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)).
25 See Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common Law, 94 VA. L. REV. 813, 814–15 (2008).
26 Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 407 (citing Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S.
438, 445 (1946)).
27 Id. at 404.
23
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court rules at the state and federal levels should be—and, under
existing doctrine, likely already are—subject to the Takings
Clause. The judicial branch’s authority to make procedural rules
outside of the adjudicatory process suggests that we should forgo
total reliance on the separation of powers in limiting the reach
of the Takings Clause. Part III then argues that, if court rules
are subject to the Takings Clause, procedure set through other
means—including court orders, judicial decisions, and case
management—should be as well.
Part IV analyzes when changes to court procedure should
constitute a taking. This Part begins by addressing a threshold
issue, arguing that some form of property right attaches when a
plaintiff brings a legal claim to court, so long as the claim is
based on an underlying property right. It then considers ways to
supplement the existing regulatory takings test to fit the extension of the judicial takings doctrine. In supplementing the test,
it looks to three themes in the Court’s takings jurisprudence: an
emphasis on the fairness of government action, the form of the
action, and a concern that takings liability not unduly impair
government functioning.
Given these themes, Part IV argues that we should supplement the test in two ways. First, we should consider the intent
of the judicial actor28 in analyzing potential judicial-procedure
takings. Where the judicial actor intends to single out a particular subset of property owners, the concern over fairness is implicated, and that should weigh in favor of a taking.
Second, we should look to whether the judicial actor is engaged in an aggregative act, combining distinct elements into
something that is greater than its parts. This is in line with both
the Court’s focus on the form of the government’s action as well as
its focus on fairness: where the judicial act generates a surplus, we
should, in fairness, use that surplus to compensate the burdened
property owner. Part IV then briefly allays concerns about forcing
other branches to pay for actions taken by the judiciary.
I. TAKINGS
This Part begins with an overview of takings jurisprudence. It
then explores some normative justifications for takings. Finally, it

28 This Comment uses the term “judicial actor” to refer to a court or other subset of
the judicial branch that creates or changes the court’s procedure.
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explains the Stop the Beach plurality’s opinion that the Takings
Clause should extend to the judicial branch.
A. Foundational Takings Jurisprudence
The Fifth Amendment commands that no “private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation.”29 “As its text
makes plain, the Takings Clause ‘does not prohibit the taking of
private property, but instead places a condition on the exercise
of that power.’” 30 Thus, the Takings Clause is only intended to
secure compensation for otherwise legitimate interferences with
property rights.31 If a government action is illegitimate, “that is
the end of the inquiry,” and “[n]o amount of compensation can
authorize such action.”32 An action could be illegitimate, for instance, if the property is not taken “for public use”33 or if it violates another provision of the Constitution.34
The government’s action can be a taking in two ways. First,
the government may directly appropriate property through its
power of eminent domain.35 Second, the government may implicitly take property when a regulation or other government action
is functionally equivalent to eminent domain.36 When an action
falls into the second category, it is conventionally referred to as
a “regulatory taking.”37 In developing the doctrine of regulatory
takings, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., observed, “The general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking.”38 In a later opinion, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor added, “The rub, of course, has been—and remains—how to discern
how far is ‘too far.’” 39

29

U.S. CONST. amend V.
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536 (2005) (quoting First Eng. Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 314 (1987)).
31 See id. at 536–37.
32 Id. at 543.
33 The Supreme Court has broadly interpreted the “public use” requirement to be
met whenever property is taken for a “public purpose.” Kelo v. City of New London, 545
U.S. 469, 479–80 (2005).
34 See, e.g., Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543.
35 See id. at 537.
36 See id. at 537–39.
37 See, e.g., James E. Krier, Judicial Takings: Musings on Stop the Beach, 3
BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 217, 218 (2014).
38 Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
39 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538.
30
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Within the category of regulatory takings, a per se regulatory taking occurs when the government forces a property owner
to submit to a permanent physical occupation40 or deprives the
property owner of all economically beneficial use of the property.41 In analyzing other potential regulatory takings, courts apply a multifactor test developed in Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. New York City.42 Under Penn Central, courts consider
(1) the economic impact of the regulation, (2) the “extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investmentbacked expectations,” and (3) the “character of the governmental
action” to determine if a regulatory taking has occurred.43
For instance, in Noghrey v. Town of Brookhaven,44 a jury
found that a regulatory taking occurred based on the town’s decision to rezone parcels of land owned by the plaintiff.45 The
plaintiff purchased two parcels zoned for business use, including
the construction of a shopping plaza. Two years later, the town
enacted a moratorium on new commercial development and rezoned the parcels to allow for only residential use.46 The jury applied Penn Central and found that the rezoning constituted a
regulatory taking.47
In practice, lower courts are highly deferential when analyzing
regulatory takings, and it is rare for a court to find that a regulatory taking has occurred.48 Indeed, some scholars have described Penn Central as the “death knell” for takings claims given the abysmal rate of success under the doctrine.49 Nonetheless,
the doctrine may have some success in constraining government
officials at the decision-making stage. Furthermore, there is a
renewed effort by some lower court judges to impose stricter requirements under the Takings Clause, suggesting the doctrine

40

See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 425–26 (1982).
See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
42 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
43 Id. at 124.
44 938 N.Y.S.2d 613 (App. Div. 2012).
45 Noghrey v. Town of Brookhaven, 852 N.Y.S.2d 220, 221 (App. Div. 2008) (describing the facts of the dispute); Noghrey, 938 N.Y.S.2d at 615 (upholding the jury’s determination that a partial regulatory taking occurred and incorporating the facts by reference).
46 Noghrey, 938 N.Y.S.2d at 615.
47 Id.
48 See James E. Krier & Stewart E. Sterk, An Empirical Study of Implicit Takings,
58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 35, 55–66 (2016).
49 Id. at 88.
41
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could be applied more stringently in the future.50 As such, even
though liability under Penn Central is rare in practice, this
Comment takes the Court’s takings jurisprudence at face value.
That is to say, it assumes that, at a minimum, Penn Central
takings exist and that the doctrine can be used to serve its intended purpose. The next Section explores this purpose, arguing
that the Takings Clause serves an important normative role in
our constitutional structure.
B. Normative Considerations in the Takings Doctrine
This Comment argues that, with some limits, the Takings
Clause should apply to court procedure. At the outset, then, it is
important to examine the function of the Takings Clause. If we
can better understand what the Takings Clause should be doing,
we can understand why it would be doctrinally and normatively
desirable to apply it to procedure.
The Court has emphasized that the Takings Clause serves
to “bar [the] Government from forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne
by the public as a whole.” 51 Professors David Dana and Thomas
Merrill argue that this “equal treatment justification remains
today the most widespread explanation for the compensation requirement” in takings scholarship.52
If equal treatment is the ultimate justification for takings,
why have the Takings Clause at all? The Equal Protection
Clause or Due Process Clause may seem better suited to the
task. The Takings Clause, however, plays a unique role because
of its remedial structure. If a government action violates the
Equal Protection Clause or Due Process Clause, the action is
simply invalid. If a government action violates the Takings
Clause, the government may continue the offending action, so
long as it compensates the aggrieved property owner. The Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses are property rules; the
Takings Clause is a liability rule.
The Takings Clause thus gives the government a flexibility
not found under the other provisions of the Constitution. It allows
50 See, e.g., Md. Shall Issue, Inc. v. Hogan, 963 F.3d 356, 375–76 (4th Cir. 2020)
(Richardson, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that
Maryland’s ban on rapid-fire trigger activators for guns constitutes a “classic taking”).
51 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Armstrong v. United
States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
52 DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 33–34 (2002).
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for some middle ground by identifying actions that the government can legitimately undertake—actions that might be completely desirable—while also recognizing that in a limited number
of cases, the government should be required to compensate those
affected. In doing so, the Takings Clause mandates that the
government spread the burden of regulation across society.
Of course, we cannot require the government to compensate
every aggrieved property owner for every regulation. As Justice
Holmes noted in developing the doctrine of regulatory takings,
“[g]overnment hardly could go on” if it were forced to “pay[ ] for
every [ ] change in the general law.”53
Thus, the Court’s early takings jurisprudence focused on
takings liability as a remedy for disproportionate burdens. In
developing the Penn Central test, the Court drew on the work of
Professor Joseph Sax, who argued that takings compensation
was a “bulwark against unfairness, rather than against mere
value diminution” resulting from regulation.54 When the regulatory burden is spread across society, we expect that the government will internalize that burden in its decision-making. But
when the regulatory burden “single[s] out”55 a subset of property
owners, we cannot have the same expectation. Thus, burdens
that single out particular property owners are analyzed as potential takings. The Takings Clause forces the government to internalize the costs of these decisions; it keeps the majority in
check, while enabling the government to continue to regulate in
the public’s interest.
Given these fairness and justice concerns, the Court has
limited its focus almost exclusively to the nature and extent of
the burden imposed on property owners.56 In Lingle v. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc.,57 the Court rejected the notion that a reviewing
court should consider the effectiveness of the government’s regulation in assessing the fairness and justice issues. The Court observed, “A test that tells us nothing about the actual burden imposed on property rights, or how that burden is allocated, cannot
tell us when justice might require that the burden be spread
among taxpayers through the payment of compensation.”58 It
53

Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413.
Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 57 (1964).
55 The Supreme Court often describes targeted property owners as being “singled
out.” E.g., Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543.
56 See id. at 537.
57 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
58 Id. at 543.
54
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continued: “The owner of a property subject to a regulation that
effectively serves a legitimate state interest may be just as singled out and just as burdened as the owner of a property subject
to an ineffective regulation.”59
Although the Court has not clarified exactly what Penn
Central’s “character” factor entails, it might incorporate some of
these fairness and justice concerns. Some scholars argue that
the character factor is meant to measure something like fairness, average reciprocity of advantage (the expected benefits a
property owner may receive versus the burden of the regulation), or the extent to which a property owner has been singled
out.60 Under these approaches, all economic losses are not created
equal.
In sum, we can understand the Takings Clause as a more
flexible alternative to the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses. To say that a government action is a taking is not to
condemn that action. Properly understood, takings law “does not
inhibit democracy by constraining those collective adjustments
to property laws that produce diminutions in economic value.”61
Rather, “takings law helps to guide adjustments to property
laws in ways that maintain property’s character as a healthy,
fair, and just democratic institution.”62
C. Judicial Takings and Stop the Beach
The Takings Clause has traditionally been applied to executive and legislative acts.63 Occasional Supreme Court jurisprudence touched on the question of whether the judicial branch
was also subject to the Takings Clause, but the cases offered no
clear answer.64 In Stop the Beach, a plurality of the Supreme
Court contended that the Takings Clause applied to all judicial
acts.65
59

Id. (emphasis in original).
See, e.g., Christopher T. Goodin, The Role and Content of the Character of the
Governmental Action Factor in a Partial Regulatory Takings Analysis, 29 U. HAW. L. REV.
437, 447–50 (2007); Michael Lewyn, Character Counts: The “Character of the Government
Action” in Regulatory Takings Actions, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 597, 633–36 (2010).
61 Timothy M. Mulvaney, Non-enforcement Takings, 59 B.C. L. REV. 145, 158 (2018).
62 Id.
63 See Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 743 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
64 For a brief summary of the cases leading up to Stop the Beach, see Michael B.
Kent, Jr., More Questions Than Answers: Situating Judicial Takings Within Existing
Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 29 VA. ENV’T L.J. 143, 151–52 (2011).
65 Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 713–15 (plurality opinion).
60
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Stop the Beach concerned a Florida statute that allowed local governments to seek permits and funds to restore eroded
beaches through deposits of sand.66 A city and county sought
permits to restore nearly seven miles of beachfront, adding seventy-five feet of dry sand.67 Under the statute, the state claimed
title to the newly created beachfront property.68 Property owners
who previously owned the beachfront objected.69 They argued
that the statute eliminated two of their common law rights:
(1) the right to receive accretions—gradual additions of sand or
other deposits to waterfront land—and (2) the right to continue
to have direct contact with the water.70 The property owners alleged that this constituted a taking in violation of the Takings
Clause.71 The Florida Supreme Court rejected the challenge.72
The property owners then argued that the Florida Supreme
Court itself “effected a [judicial] taking” by abrogating the owners’ common law property rights.73
A plurality of the Supreme Court determined that the Takings
Clause applied to the judiciary: “The Takings Clause . . . is not
addressed to the action of a specific branch or branches. It is
concerned simply with the act, and not with the governmental
actor.”74 Furthermore, “[i]t would be absurd to allow a State to
do by judicial decree what the Takings Clause forbids it to do by
legislative fiat.”75 Thus, where “a legislature or a court declares
that what was once an established right of private property no
longer exists, it has taken that property.”76
The plurality nonetheless determined that there was no judicial taking in the case because the Florida Supreme Court had
not actually changed the state’s property laws.77 The Florida
Supreme Court’s decision was consistent with a 1927 case that
had gone unmentioned by the state court opinions, so there was
no taking.78
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78

Id. at 709–11.
Id. at 711.
Id. at 709–10.
Id. at 711.
Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 711.
Id. at 711–12.
Id. at 712.
Id.
Id. at 713–14.
Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 714.
Id. at 715 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 731–32.
Id. at 730–33.
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Justice Stephen Breyer (joined by Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg) concurred in part, expressing concerns that the plurality’s approach would disturb the balance of federal and state
law.79 He suggested that the plurality’s failure to offer limitations
or canons of deference would create a serious risk that federal
judges would unduly influence state property law, “a matter of
significant state interest.”80 Justice Breyer suggested that the
Court should follow the doctrine of constitutional avoidance and
limit its holding to the finding that the decision at issue was not
a judicial taking.81
Justice Anthony Kennedy (joined by Justice Sonia
Sotomayor) also concurred in part, agreeing with the plurality that
there was no taking. He additionally agreed with Justice Breyer
that the case did not require the Court to determine “whether,
or when” a judicial decision could violate the Takings Clause.82
He wrote separately to note “certain difficulties” that should be
considered before adopting a doctrine of judicial takings.83
Justice Kennedy first suggested that the Due Process
Clause, not the Takings Clause, was applicable: “If a judicial decision, as opposed to an act of the executive or the legislature,
eliminates an established property right, the judgment could be
set aside as a deprivation of property without due process of
law.”84 If we analyze such decisions under the Takings Clause,
he argued, we assume that the decision eliminating established
property rights is “otherwise constitutional,” so long as compensation is paid.85 This is problematic because the judiciary, unlike
the executive and legislative branches, was not “designed to
make policy decisions about ‘the need for, and likely effectiveness of, regulatory actions.’” 86 Essentially, Justice Kennedy argued that the judicial branch should be regulated with property
rules (rather than liability rules) because of the nature of judicial
authority. Justice Kennedy also worried that a judicial takings

79

Id. at 743–44 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 744 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
81 Id. at 744–45.
82 Id. at 733–34 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
83 Id. at 734.
84 Id. at 735.
85 Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 736 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment) (quoting E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 545 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part)).
86 Id. at 736 (quoting Lingle, 544 U.S. at 545).
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doctrine would not have the intended effect of constraining
courts.87 Rather, it would empower judges to change property
rights in ways that they assumed would benefit the public.88
In the wake of Stop the Beach, many scholars criticized the
judicial takings doctrine.89 Though the scholarship does not define the doctrine, much of it implicitly argues that the judicial
branch, when acting under its own authority, should not be subject to the Takings Clause at all. Given this criticism, the judicial takings doctrine encompasses more than just the idea that
changes to the common law of property could be takings. The
criticism suggests that the doctrine is implicated whenever a
takings case involves “independent judicial action,” meaning judicial actions taken under the judiciary’s independent authority.90
This issue of authority is implicit in the disagreement between the plurality opinion and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence
over whether we should apply the Takings Clause or the Due
Process Clause to certain judicial actions affecting property
owners. As Justice Kennedy’s concurrence noted, a taking must
be an otherwise legitimate exercise of government power. Does
the judiciary have the authority to carry out acts that could be
takings, or is that power limited to the executive and legislative
branches? If the judiciary has no such authority, then Justice
Kennedy is right: the Due Process Clause is the correct framework. But, if there are certain areas where the judiciary does
have this authority, the Takings Clause is the better framework.91
87

Id. at 739.
Id.
89 See, e.g., infra Part II.A.
90 When the judiciary interprets or enforces existing statutes, those actions do not
fall under this definition of “judicial takings.” The key distinction is whether the judiciary is acting on its own authority or whether it is relying on an existing framework
promulgated by another branch. Prior to Stop the Beach, the Supreme Court seemed to
assume that at least some judicial actions were subject to the Takings Clause, though it
did not directly confront the issue. In the two cases that came close to the issue, the judicial takings doctrine was not implicated: in both cases, plaintiffs alleged that the court’s
interpretation of a statute or state constitution was a taking. See Webb’s Fabulous
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 162–65 (1980) (analyzing whether a state
court’s interpretation of a statute was a taking); PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447
U.S. 74, 82–84 (1980) (analyzing whether a state court’s interpretation of the California
state constitution was a taking). When the court is interpreting the actions of another
branch (or the Constitution), there is no “independent judicial action,” so the doctrine of
judicial takings is not implicated. In adopting this definition, this Comment aims to isolate those instances that raise the question of whether the judiciary has the independent
authority to “take.”
91 In the plurality opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia suggested that the usual remedy
for a judicial taking would be to abrogate the at-issue judicial action rather than to pay
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Parts II and III of this Comment argue that courts’ power over
procedure is one such area.
Justice Breyer’s concurrence also suggested that if we are to
have a doctrine of judicial takings, we need to find ways to limit
its reach so that federal courts do not unduly interfere with
state law. This issue is addressed in Part IV.
II. JUDICIAL RULEMAKING AS A SITE OF TAKINGS
There are two common threads running through criticism of
the judicial takings doctrine. First, as noted in Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence, many critics suggest that the judiciary does not
have the authority to engage in potential takings. Second, critics
also argue that the Court’s concerns about the government singling out certain property owners are not applicable to the judicial branch.92 Taken together, these critiques suggest that independent judicial action should not be subject to the Takings
Clause. These separation of powers critiques are discussed in
Part II.A.
Part II.B argues that state courts’ power over procedural
rulemaking both blurs the boundaries between the branches
and suggests that the judicial branch can single out individual
property owners. States have adopted varied approaches governing judicial procedure. In some states, the legislature is responsible for making rules of procedure; in others, rulemaking authority
is vested in the judiciary. Given these varied approaches, and the
potential for certain procedural rules to constitute takings if enacted by the legislature, state court rules should be subject to
the Takings Clause, regardless of their source. Part II.C notes
that the federal judiciary, too, may have some independent authority to make procedural rules outside of a legislative delegation of power. Given this authority, all procedural rules should
be subject to the Takings Clause.
damages. Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 723–24. If we accept this argument, the remedial
distinction between the Takings Clause and Due Process Clause disappears, and the
benefits of the takings approach are de minimis. Yet Justice Scalia’s suggestion is not
entirely grounded. For one, under the Court’s existing takings jurisprudence, even when
the government rescinds an action, it must still pay damages for the taking while it was
in effect. First Eng., 482 U.S. at 321. Second, Justice Scalia did not argue that damages
would be unavailable, only that the usual remedy would be to invalidate the decision.
Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 723–24. Finally, Stop the Beach is a plurality opinion: there is
no holding that the remedy for judicial takings is abrogation. This Comment assumes that
the damages remedy remains available for judicial takings, as it is in all other takings cases.
92 These singling-out concerns are discussed in Part I.B.
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A. Separation of Powers Arguments Against Judicial Takings
Many critics suggest that the doctrine of judicial takings is
inappropriate because it does not account for the different kinds
of authority given to each branch. Justice Kennedy raised this
issue in Stop the Beach, noting that courts were not designed to
engage in regulatory action.93 In his seminal article Why the
Judiciary Is Different, Professor John Echeverria similarly argues that the plurality’s opinion “has the ring of oversimplification,” because “[c]ourts are, in many ways, different
from the other branches in terms of their mission, institutional
structure, and method of operation.”94
Echeverria argues that singling-out concerns are less pressing in the context of the judicial branch because the judiciary
was not designed to be a majoritarian institution.95 Instead, “a
primary function of the courts is to check the majority.”96 Even
where judges are elected—or “act, or appear to act, more like
politicians”—this does not justify a “sweeping doctrine of judicial
takings.”97 In addition, Echeverria argues, singling out is less of a
concern because changes to common law “tend to apply broadly
across the community.”98 Rulings, even those issued in the context of particular disputes, typically apply to similarly situated
owners; they do not single out a few individuals.99
Echeverria’s line of criticism relies on the notion that the existing division between the branches is a normatively desirable
way to limit the reach of the Takings Clause. In setting procedural rules, however, courts do not always act like courts. For
one, courts can set procedure outside of the traditional adjudicatory process, acting more like a legislature or an agency. And
courts’ rulemaking power demonstrates that the judiciary can,
at least occasionally, single out certain property owners to bear
a public burden. In the case of California’s Emergency Rule 1,
for instance, the judiciary used its rulemaking power to “assist[ ]
tenants” at the expense (at least temporarily) of landlords.100
More fundamentally, Echeverria’s criticism suggests a neat
93

Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 736 (quoting Lingle, 544 U.S. at 545).
John D. Echeverria, Stop the Beach Renourishment: Why the Judiciary Is Different, 35 VT. L. REV. 475, 487 (2010).
95 Id. at 488–90.
96 Id. at 488.
97 Id. at 490.
98 Id. at 492–93.
99 Echeverria, supra note 94, at 493.
100 REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL, supra note 13, at 7.
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separation of powers among the branches. But what happens in
cases where the division between the branches is not so neat? Or
when it is inconsistent as between the state and federal levels?
Judicial rulemaking exemplifies these issues.
B. State Rulemaking and the Separation of Powers
The federal government’s strict separation of powers does
not always map onto the states. In contrast to the federal government, states have taken “varied, pragmatic approach[es] in
establishing governments,” meaning that some units of state
government cannot “easily be classified in the neat categories
favored by civics texts.”101
Rulemaking demonstrates the varied approaches. At the
state level, there are two broad systems for rulemaking. A minority of states are “code states,” which primarily rely on legislatures to make the rules of civil procedure.102 The vast majority of
states are “rules states,” in which the court is empowered to
make the rules.103 In many rules states, the state constitution
confers this power directly on the judiciary—that is, unlike in
the federal system discussed below, rulemaking power has not
been delegated to the judiciary by the legislature.104 Typically,
the legislature has the power to review or revise the rules,
though a supermajority is required in a handful of states.105
Years before Stop the Beach, the Supreme Court offered insight into whether the source of a court rule mattered in its takings analysis. It suggested that, at least when states have adopted
the same rules via different processes, the source of the rules is
irrelevant. In Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington,106 the

101 Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 482 (1968) (quoting Robert Wood, The
Pattern of Local Government, in POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 890,
891–92 (Alan F. Westin ed., 1965)).
102 Zachary D. Clopton, Making State Civil Procedure, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 10
(2018). The code states are California, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana,
New York, North Carolina, and Oklahoma. Id.
103 Id. at 9–11. The remaining forty-one states are rules states. Id.
104 See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VI, § 150 (“The supreme court shall make and promulgate rules governing the administration of all courts and rules governing practice and
procedure in all courts.”); ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 15 (“The supreme court shall make
and promulgate rules governing the administration of all courts.”); ARIZ. CONST. art. 6,
§ 5 (“The supreme court shall have . . . [p]ower to make rules relative to all procedural
matters in any court.”). For a comprehensive list of the source of states’ rulemaking authority, see Clopton, supra note 102, at 46–64.
105 Clopton, supra note 102, at 10 n.39.
106 538 U.S. 216 (2003).
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Court considered state rules that required lawyers to deposit
certain clients’ funds into trust accounts, called IOLTAs.107
When attorneys hold clients’ funds, they cannot mix the clients’
money with their own, but they may pool the clients’ funds into
a single account.108 Every state and the District of Columbia has
created an IOLTA program whereby lawyers deposit noninterest-bearing client funds into an IOLTA account, and interest from those accounts is used to fund legal services for the
“needy.”109 In Brown, the plaintiffs claimed the IOLTA requirement was a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment.110
What is interesting for our purposes is the way in which
IOLTA programs were adopted. Only five states adopted the
programs through their legislature.111 In the remainder of the
states, the programs were adopted by the state’s highest court,
either under statutory or constitutional authority.112 In a footnote in Brown, the Court observed, “Petitioners appear to suggest that a different constitutional analysis might apply to a legislative program than to one adopted by the State’s judiciary.
We assume, however, that the procedure followed by the State
when promulgating its IOLTA Rules is irrelevant to the takings
issue.”113 This foreshadowed the Court’s discussion in Stop the
Beach: the Court focused on the state action itself rather than
the identity of the state actor.
The Court then suggested that the IOLTA program could
constitute a per se taking: “[T]he interest earned in the IOLTA
accounts is the ‘private property’ of the owner of the principal. If
this is so, the transfer of the interest to the Foundation here
seems more akin [to a per se takings case].”114 The Court then
assumed that the plaintiffs retained ownership of at least a portion of the deposits in the accounts, that those deposits generated

107

Id. at 220. IOLTA is an acronym for “interest on lawyers’ trust accounts.”
Id. at 220–21.
109 Id. at 220–23.
110 Id. at 228–29.
111 Brown, 538 U.S. at 221 n.2.
112 The rule at issue in Brown was established by the Washington State Supreme
Court under its statutory authority to regulate the practice of law. In other states, the
rule was adopted under the courts’ constitutional authority. In Indiana, the legislature
enacted an IOLTA program, but the Indiana Supreme Court struck it down as an encroachment on the court’s authority to regulate the practice of law. Id. The Indiana
Supreme Court later enacted its own IOLTA program. Id.
113 Id. (citations omitted).
114 Id. at 235 (quotation marks and citations omitted) (quoting Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 172 (1998)).
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interest, and “that their interest was taken for a public use
when it was ultimately turned over to the Foundation.”115
Even with these assumptions, the Court found there was no
constitutional violation because of the way that the IOLTA
program was structured.116 Under the Takings Clause, the just
compensation owed to the property owner is measured by the
property owner’s loss, not the government’s gain.117 In Washington,
lawyers were required to deposit money into the accounts only if
the money, on its own, could not generate net earnings.118 That
is to say, if the money had not been deposited into the accounts,
the clients would not have received any interest at all. Thus,
even if property were taken, it would not have been taken in violation of the Fifth Amendment because the property owners experienced no net loss.119
The Court did not hold that rules promulgated by the judiciary should be analyzed in the same way as rules promulgated
by the legislature; it merely assumed as much for the purposes
of its opinion. The appeal of this approach is obvious. Where
states have taken varied approaches to rulemaking, sometimes
involving the judicial branch, the Court should not rely on a
formalistic notion of the separation of powers to limit the reach
of the Takings Clause. This would create an artificial barrier for
takings: IOLTA programs created through state legislatures
would be subject to the Takings Clause, while programs created
through judiciaries would not be.
Brown also demonstrates that the Due Process Clause is not
an adequate substitute for the judicial takings doctrine, contrary
to Justice Kennedy’s later suggestion in Stop the Beach. Justice
Kennedy argued that the Court could simply strike down a potential judicial taking under the Due Process Clause because
any potential taking would simply exceed the judiciary’s power.120 In Brown—and in the case of California’s Emergency
Rule 1, discussed in this Comment’s Introduction—the question
of the judiciary’s power to make certain rules is a question for
that state’s constitution. To adjudicate either rule under the
Due Process Clause would require federal courts to interpret
115

Id. at 235.
Brown, 538 U.S. at 240.
117 Id. at 235–36.
118 Id. at 239.
119 Id. at 239–40.
120 Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 735 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
116
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(or reinterpret) the scope of the state judiciary’s authority. As
Justice Antonin Scalia argued in Stop the Beach, federal separation of powers principles do not apply to the states, and courts
should not impose those principles on the states via the Due
Process Clause.121 It would be inconsistent with the principles of
federalism to allow the Court to second-guess a state judiciary’s
authority under the Due Process Clause, especially in cases
where the state constitution vests rulemaking in the judiciary.
Of course, there’s a third option here. Federal courts could
refuse to analyze these rules under the Due Process Clause for
the reasons noted above, and then they could simply find that
the rule is constitutional. This approach, however, is incompatible with Brown and the Court’s takings jurisprudence. As the
Court made clear in Lingle, a proper takings analysis requires
that the Court focus on the result of the government’s action.122
A test that categorically excludes judicially created rules from
the Takings Clause is a test that “tells us nothing about the actual burden imposed on property rights, or how that burden is
allocated.”123 This kind of categorical rule is unsuited to the purpose of the Takings Clause—namely, identifying when burdens
should be spread across society. Furthermore, such a categorical
rule could create a troubling incentive to funnel potential takings
through the judiciary’s rulemaking process. Thus, neither the
Due Process Clause nor inaction is an adequate substitute for
subjecting court rules to the Takings Clause.
In addition, when rulemaking, courts must take into account the needs of the judicial system and society as a whole. In
setting dockets, courts must balance the rights of individual litigants with the system’s need to preserve limited judicial resources and society’s need for certain cases to be resolved
promptly. For instance, Michigan’s State Court Administrative
Office offered guidance to its courts in “triaging” cases during
the pandemic.124 It recommended that courts prioritize cases
where “an immediate liberty and/or safety concern is present” as
well as those where “[p]ublic safety concerns are paramount” or
“[c]onstitutional rights are primarily implicated.”125

121

Id. at 719 (plurality opinion).
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543.
123 Id.
124 State Ct. Admin. Off., Process for Triaging Case Actions During the COVID-19
Crisis, MICH. CTS., https://perma.cc/GLZ5-GPJH.
125 Id.
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In triaging cases, the Michigan courts weighed society’s
needs—in promoting liberty and public safety—in addition to
the discrete interests of individuals in any given case. This
seems reasonable: we would not expect courts to control their
dockets by picking cases at random. Yet even if this is desirable,
we are asking courts to make something like a political decision.
And, given the example of California’s Emergency Rule 1, it is
not obvious that these decisions are less likely to single out particular individuals. Given these factors, state judicial rulemaking is a potential site for takings.
C. Federal Judicial Rulemaking?
Federal judicial rulemaking is more complicated. At the federal level, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that judicial
rulemaking occupies an unclear position within the separation
of powers framework. The Court has described judicial rulemaking as falling within a “twilight area,” where the “activities
of the separate Branches merge.”126 Congress has delegated
rulemaking power to the Supreme Court through the Rules
Enabling Act127 (REA). When the Supreme Court makes rules
under the REA, it seems to be stepping outside of its function
as an adjudicator of “Cases and Controversies” under the grant
of judicial power in Article III.128 Nonetheless, “the federal system entertains a fiction that it is not the Supreme Court, in an
Article III sense, making these rules.”129 Rather, judges are acting as an independent agency within the judicial branch.130
If judicial rulemaking were limited to the process prescribed
by the REA, the federal takings issue might seem simple: we could
simply continue with the fiction that the Court is not making
rules. Applying the Takings Clause to these rules—or to the
Court’s interpretation of these rules—would not be a judicial

126

Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 386 (1989).
28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077.
128 See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 388–90 (noting that the Judicial Conference of the
United States, the Rules Advisory Committees, and the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts “do not exercise judicial power in the constitutional sense of deciding cases and controversies”).
129 Michael Blasie, A Separation of Powers Defense of Federal Rulemaking Power, 66
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 593, 630 (2011).
130 Id. at 630. This fiction is important because it “allows parties to contest the validity
of the rules, avoids the prohibition on advisory opinions, and allows the Justices and
members of the Judicial Conference to later rule on these issues impartially.” Id.
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taking. It would just be another application of the Takings
Clause to an (indirect) legislative act.131
But this does not tell the whole story. First, it is, at the very
least, ambiguous whether the Supreme Court has rulemaking
authority outside of a legislative delegation of power. Many
scholars argue that some form of inherent procedural authority is
included in the grant of judicial power in Article III.132 Professor
Michael Blasie, for instance, argues that Article III grants “an
inherent power to create rules necessary for the fair and
constitutional adjudication of cases.”133 He argues that relying on
statutory authority as the sole basis for the Court’s rulemaking
authority “fails to address two crucial” facts.134 First, courts have
not clarified their constitutional authority to make rules outside
of a statutory grant because of the REA’s broad grant of authority
and the doctrine of constitutional avoidance.135 Second, statutory
authority “fails to account for court rules outside the bounds of,
or filling the gaps of, the federal rules.”136
In filling in gaps, federal and state courts have asserted
their inherent authority to make rules.137 And, despite statutory
authority to make rules, federal courts have occasionally chosen
“to exert an alternative inherent power to make the rules.”138
Thus, the federal judiciary may have some independent authority
for rulemaking as well.
Given that the bounds of federal courts’ inherent rulemaking powers are unclear and that courts often rely on the
statutory grant of authority, the issue of judicial-procedure
takings may not arise as often in the federal context. Part III
argues that other forms of procedure—including docket control,
something indisputably within federal courts’ inherent authority—could also constitute a taking. Thus, perhaps the existing
fiction could address takings challenges to federal rules, but the

131 See Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 162–64 (1980);
cf. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82–83 (1980).
132 Blasie, supra note 129, at 616–17. For another in-depth analysis of the constitutional sources of the Supreme Court’s procedural authority, see generally Barrett, supra
note 25.
133 Blasie, supra note 129, at 616–17.
134 Id. at 612.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.; see also, e.g., Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 560–64, 562 n.6
(3d Cir. 1985).
138 Blasie, supra note 129, at 612 (emphasis added).
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doctrine of judicial takings may still be implicated when federal
courts make procedure through other means.
To the extent that these sections suggest there is a problem,
we might think there is an easy solution: judicial rulemaking
should be subject to the Takings Clause because it is akin to an
administrative or legislative act and it occurs outside of courts’
adjudicatory powers. This seems to be the approach that the
Court took in Brown when it applied the Takings Clause to
IOLTA programs enacted by state judiciaries, although it did
not make this explicit.
We could still limit this interpretation of the judicial takings
doctrine to apply only to rulemaking. Consistent with this approach, we might still think that when the court is carrying out
its core function—that is, when it is adjudicating cases—the
Takings Clause should not apply. But that raises some difficulties: courts have the ability to choose the means through which
they set procedure and, if we limit application of the judicial
takings doctrine to rules alone, there may be an incentive for
courts to use the other means at their disposal.
III. PROCEDURE OUTSIDE OF RULEMAKING AND THE CHOICE-OFMEANS PROBLEM
Outside of the judicial rulemaking process, judges make
procedure through cases themselves—when writing decisions,
managing cases, and managing their courtrooms.139 The fact that
the judiciary can choose the means through which to promulgate
procedure suggests that we should not necessarily distinguish
between rulemaking and other procedural authority in takings
cases.
This “choice-of-means” problem also arises in another area
of takings jurisprudence: it is one justification for the doctrine of
regulatory takings. Condemnation (through eminent domain)
and regulation are alternate means by which the government
can pursue its substantive ends.140 Without a doctrine of regulatory takings, the government would “favor” regulation over condemnation in order to avoid paying compensation for its use.141
139 See Clopton, supra note 102, 10–11 (addressing state procedure). See generally
Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen Staszewski, The Supreme Court’s Regulation of Civil
Procedure: Lessons from Administrative Law, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1188, 1194–97 (2012)
(addressing federal procedure).
140 See Krier, supra note 37, at 220–21.
141 See id. at 220.
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Scholars dispute whether the choice-of-means problem has
any application to the judicial branch. Some scholars argue that,
because courts have no power of eminent domain, courts are not
seeking to evade their constitutional obligation to provide just
compensation when they undertake certain actions.142 Other
scholars and the Court in Stop the Beach, however, suggest that
when evaluating these substitution effects, we should consider
the government as one entity rather than looking to each branch
in isolation. Professor James Krier observes, “Whether or not
courts have the power of eminent domain, governments surely
do, and courts . . . are indisputably a branch of the government.”143 Thus, “just as governments should not be able to evade
the obligations of the Takings Clause by substituting regulatory
activity for explicit condemnation, they should not be able to
evade the obligations by substituting judicial activity for regulatory activity.”144
Putting aside the question of whether it is desirable to view
the government as one entity for takings purposes, procedure is
one area of law where we should be concerned about substitution effects within the judiciary itself. In achieving a procedural
end, a court has multiple options: create a rule, issue a court order, write a decision, or adjust the management of its cases. It is
rare for a court to have such a multitude of means available in
other areas of law. For instance, a court cannot change the
common law of property outside of an actual case. Thus, when
thinking about courts’ power over procedure, we should think
beyond just court rules. In considering other forms of procedure
that could result in takings, we can look to two areas of law:
requirements that attorneys offer pro bono legal services and the
practices that courts use when managing their dockets.
A. Mandatory Performance of Legal Services
The Supreme Court once observed that courts have the duty
(in certain circumstances) to appoint counsel and that counsel,
as officers of the court, are bound to accept such appointments.145

142

Id. (quoting Dana & Merrill, supra note 52, at 229–30).
Id.
144 Id. at 221.
145 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932). That said, the Supreme Court
has not determined whether federal courts, outside of a statutory grant of authority,
have the inherent power to require attorneys to render pro bono legal services for civil
plaintiffs. See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 310 (1989).
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As such, courts have confronted allegations that requiring
attorneys to render legal services with little to no compensation
is a taking.146 Such requirements can be enacted by the legislature via statute or by judicial actors through court rules and
court orders. This raises two choice-of-means problems. First, if
only the legislature were subject to the Takings Clause, these
requirements could be funneled through the judiciary. Second, if
only court rules were subject to the Takings Clause—a potential
solution to the problems raised in Part II—then these requirements could be enacted via court order.
To be clear, it is rare for a court to find that such requirements are a taking, but it is not unprecedented. Several state
courts have found that these requirements can violate the Takings
Clause under their state constitutions.147 At least one federal
court has suggested that mandatory pro bono work could rise to
the level of a taking.148 Contrasting two cases in this area
demonstrates (1) judicial actors’ potential authority to take and
(2) the choice-of-means problem.
In Scheehle v. Justices of the Supreme Court of Arizona,149
the Ninth Circuit considered whether a court rule requiring an
attorney to serve as an arbitrator could constitute a taking.150
Arizona law required that each superior court provide for arbitration of certain cases by court rule.151 The local rules of the
Superior Court of Maricopa County required that attorneys
within the county serve as arbitrators for a flat fee of $75 per

The Court has held that federal courts have the inherent authority to appoint private
attorneys to prosecute contempt because this is a necessary component of initiating contempt proceedings. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 793
(1987). Several lower federal courts and state courts have found that they possess a more
general inherent power to appoint attorneys. See, e.g., United States v. Accetturo, 842
F.2d 1408, 1412 (3d Cir. 1988); Naranjo v. Thompson, 809 F.3d 793, 801–04 (5th Cir. 2015);
S.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Tharp, 439 S.E.2d 854, 857 (S.C. 1994) (collecting cases). But see
Colbert v. Rickmon, 747 F. Supp. 518, 527 (W.D. Ark. 1990).
146 See, e.g., United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 635 (9th Cir. 1965); Tharp, 439
S.E.2d at 857. For an in-depth analysis of this issue, see Bruce Andrew Green, Note,
Court Appointment of Attorneys in Civil Cases: The Constitutionality of Uncompensated
Legal Assistance, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 366, 383–90 (1981); and David L. Shapiro, The
Enigma of the Lawyer’s Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 735, 771–84 (1980).
147 See Tharp, 439 S.E.2d at 857 (collecting cases); DeLisio v. Alaska Superior Ct.,
740 P.2d 437, 442 (Alaska 1987).
148 Fam. Div. Trial Laws. of the Superior Ct.–D.C., Inc. v. Moultrie, 725 F.2d 695,
705 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
149 508 F.3d 887 (9th Cir. 2007).
150 Id. at 889.
151 Id.
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day.152 Appointed attorneys could be excused if they had served
as an arbitrator for more than two days in a year.153 The plaintiff
was appointed as an arbitrator, and he objected, alleging that
the system was unconstitutional.154
The district court certified the question of the propriety of the
appointment system under Arizona law to the Arizona Supreme
Court.155 The Arizona Supreme Court held that the court rule
was a constitutional exercise of the judiciary’s power under the
Arizona Constitution.156 The Arizona Constitution gives the judiciary the power to regulate “the practice of law” and to supervise
judicial officers, including attorneys.157 Thus, the court held, “The
power extended to this Court by the [Arizona] constitution includes the authority to promulgate regulations assigning limited
quasi-judicial functions to lawyers as judicial officers.”158 This
includes the “authority to require a lawyer’s services, even on a
pro bono basis, to assist in the administration of justice.”159 It
cabined this power, noting, “Whatever appointment process a
court adopts should reflect the principle that lawyers have the
right to refuse to be drafted on a systematic basis and put to
work at any price to satisfy a county’s obligation to provide
counsel to indigent defendants.” 160 It held that the Maricopa
County rule met this requirement.161
Under the Arizona Constitution, then, the rule was a permissible exercise of the court’s power. The plaintiff alleged that
it was nonetheless a taking under the federal Constitution.162 He
argued that the appointment system deprived him of both his
services as a lawyer and the out-of-pocket costs necessarily incurred during arbitration.163 The Ninth Circuit found that this
did not constitute a taking.164 The Ninth Circuit applied Penn
Central, finding that the imposition was “negligible” because
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Id.
154 Scheehle, 508 F.3d at 889–90.
155 Id. at 890.
156 Scheehle v. Justs. of the Sup. Ct. of the State of Ariz., 120 P.3d 1092, 1100
(Ariz. 2005).
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158 Id.
159 Id. at 1102.
160 Id. (quoting Zarabia v. Bradshaw, 912 P.2d 5, 8 (Ariz. 1996)).
161 Scheehle, 120 P.3d at 1102.
162 Scheehle, 508 F.3d at 890.
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(1) it did not hinder his other legal work, (2) it did not interfere
with “distinct investment-backed expectations” because he knew
of the system when he joined the bar, and (3) it was merely a
program “adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to
promote the public good.”165
The appointment system in Scheehle was adopted pursuant
to a court rule, but attorneys are often appointed as counsel pursuant to court order. In DeLisio v. Alaska Superior Court,166 for
instance, the Supreme Court of Alaska considered whether there
was a taking in violation of the Alaska Constitution when the
court ordered an attorney to represent an indigent defendant
without reasonable compensation.167 The plaintiff, an attorney in
private practice, was appointed by the court to represent an indigent person charged with sexual abuse of a minor because the
public defender’s office had a conflict of interest.168 The plaintiff
refused the appointment, and he was ordered to commence representation by a certain time or be jailed for contempt until he
did.169 The plaintiff appealed.170
The Supreme Court of Alaska held that the appointment of an
attorney without reasonable compensation was a taking under the
Alaska Constitution.171 It rejected the argument that an attorney
could be denied compensation based on the traditional role of
lawyers as “officers of the court.”172 Under Alaska’s Constitution,
property is taken when the state deprives the owner of the economic advantages of ownership.173 The court held, “When the
court appropriates an attorney’s labor, the court has prevented
the attorney from selling that labor on the open market and has
thus denied to the attorney the economic benefit of that labor.”174
The property was taken for “public use” because the system of
representation was meant to ensure that all defendants received
a fair trial.175 The court continued: “Because the appointment
thus benefits all persons equally, the cost of providing such
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Id. at 892–93 (quoting Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539).
740 P.2d 437 (Alaska 1987).
Id. at 439–43.
Id. at 438.
Id.
Id.
DeLisio, 740 P.2d at 442.
Id. at 441.
Id. at 443.
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representation must be equally borne rather than shunted to
specific persons or specifically identified classes of persons.”176
As such, the appointment of counsel for only nominal compensation was a taking under the Alaska Constitution.177
Both Scheehle and DeLisio accepted that it was within the
judiciary’s authority to appoint attorneys for nominal compensation. Yet both acknowledged that such a system could—at least
potentially—be a taking.178 In Scheehle, the system was promulgated by court rule. In DeLisio, it was promulgated by court order. This raises the choice-of-means problem: because courts can
choose the means by which they adopt such a system, both
should be subject to the Takings Clause.
One might wonder how controversial this argument really
is, given that both sets of opinions assumed that the courts’ requirements were subject to the Takings Clause. Properly understood, however, these are judicial takings cases: they implicate
questions of the judiciary’s independent authority to “take.”
Scheehle acknowledged this: it certified the question of the judiciary’s authority to promulgate the appointment system to the
Arizona Supreme Court.179 Once the Arizona Supreme Court
determined that the rule was a permissible exercise of judicial
power, the question remained: Was the rule a taking? Even
though these opinions implicitly assumed that the Takings Clause
should apply to these judicial actions, these are judicial takings
cases. The next Section considers yet another form of judicial act
that raises the choice-of-means problem: docket management.
B. Docket Management
Docket management can be a tool of public policy while also
uncontroversially falling within both state and federal courts’
inherent powers. The Supreme Court has acknowledged “the
power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the
causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself,
for counsel, and for litigants.”180 In a leading case on the scope of
176

DeLisio, 740 P.2d at 443.
Id.
178 Scheehle emphasized that the appointment system had a “negligible” impact on
the plaintiff’s legal practice, potentially leaving open the possibility that a more significant imposition could work a taking. Scheehle, 508 F.3d at 892.
179 Id. at 890.
180 Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936); see also Link v. Wabash R.R. Co.,
370 U.S. 626, 630–31 (1962) (acknowledging the existence of courts’ “‘inherent power,’
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federal courts’ inherent power, the Third Circuit observed that it
is “not disputed” that courts have an inherent power to manage
their dockets.181 In fact, several state courts have found that control of the docket is within the state judiciary’s exclusive control
and therefore beyond the legislature’s reach.182 In a particularly
forceful opinion, a New York state court found that a statute
requiring courts to grant an “immediate trial” in certain
circumstances was an unconstitutional violation of the New
York Constitution’s separation of powers.183 The court stated,
“The courts are not the puppets of the Legislature. They are an
independent branch of the government, as necessary and powerful
in their sphere as either of the other great divisions.”184 The statute
was unconstitutional because it interfered with a “fundamental
element of inherent judicial power,” namely the “authority to
control the court’s calendar.”185
The Supreme Court’s management of asbestos cases offers a
clear example of the intersection of docket control and public
policy. In 1997, the Court warned that there was an “asbestoslitigation crisis.”186 Part of the problem was that up to 90% of
claimants had “no medically cognizable injury or impairment,”
and critics became worried that those claims would deplete the
limited resources of asbestos defendants.187
Federal courts used their authority to manage their docket
to address the crisis. The federal asbestos docket prioritized
claimants suffering from mesothelioma or lung cancer.188 In one
case, a federal judge dismissed all nonmalignant asbestos claims
without prejudice while tolling the statute of limitations.189 His
their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases”);
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991).
181 Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 561 (3d Cir. 1985).
182 See, e.g., Atchinson v. Long, 251 P. 486, 489 (Okla. 1926):
The right to control its order of business . . . has always been recognized as
inherent in courts, and to strip them of that authority would necessarily render
them so impotent and useless as to leave little excuse for their existence and
place in the hands of the legislative branch of the state power and control never
contemplated by the Constitution.
See also Lang v. Pataki, 674 N.Y.S.2d 903, 913 (Sup. Ct. 1998) (collecting cases).
183 Lang, 674 N.Y.S.2d at 914.
184 Id. at 913 (quoting Riglander v. Star Co., 90 N.Y.S. 772, 775 (App. Div. 1904)).
185 Id.; see also Atchinson, 251 P. at 489.
186 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 597 (1997).
187 Mark A. Behrens & Manuel López, Unimpaired Asbestos Dockets: They Are
Constitutional, 24 REV. LITIG. 253, 254–56 (2005).
188 Id. at 273–74.
189 Id. at 274.
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administrative order emphasized that the court had a responsibility to manage the cases in a way that would “protect the
rights of all the parties, yet preserve and maintain any funds
available for compensation to victims.”190 The court worried that
the “race to the courthouse” would deplete funds that would otherwise be available to deserving plaintiffs.191
In other cases, federal courts used different procedural
mechanisms to preserve the resources of asbestos defendants.
For instance, a judicial panel in multidistrict litigation declined
to remand the issue of punitive damages to transferee courts,
though they allowed the compensatory matters to proceed to trial.192 The Third Circuit declined a writ of mandamus that challenged the practice.193 While noting that the panel had broad
discretion over its assigned functions, the court stated that “[a]n
even more compelling reason to adopt the Panel’s interpretation
is the public policy underlying the practice of severing punitive
damages claims.”194 The court contended, “It is responsible public policy to give priority to compensatory claims over exemplary
punitive damage windfalls; this prudent conservation more than
vindicates the Panel’s decision to withhold punitive damage
claims on remand.”195
States, too, had a multitude of avenues by which they could
(and did) respond. Some state legislatures adopted “medical criteria” laws that required asbestos plaintiffs to present evidence
of a physical impairment in order to proceed with their claims.196
State courts took similar measures through their inherent
powers. A number of jurisdictions adopted an “unimpaired asbestos docket,” giving priority to the sick and preserving compensation for those who might become sick in the future.197
Claims on the unimpaired docket did not age, and a plaintiff could
petition to have their case moved to the active docket by presenting medical evidence that they had developed an impairing

190 Id. at 275 (quoting In re Asbestos Prods., Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 2002 WL
32151574, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 2002), vacated, No. CIV. A. 2:01-MD-875, 2009 WL
2222977 (E.D. Pa. July 17, 2009)).
191 Id. at 275 (quoting In re Asbestos, 2002 WL 32151574, at *1).
192 See In re Collins, 233 F.3d 809, 812 (3d Cir. 2000).
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Mark A. Behrens, What’s New in Asbestos Litigation?, 28 REV. LITIG. 501,
505–06 (2009).
197 Behrens & López, supra note 187, at 262.
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medical condition.198 Such practices were effective: as a New
York Appellate Division justice observed, “A preliminary estimate indicates that the Deferred Docket reduced the number of
cases actually pending in my court by 80 percent.”199
These courts justified this practice as part of their inherent
power to manage dockets “in a manner consistent with an economical allocation of judicial resources and the parties’ interests.”200 Numerous appellate courts agreed that the practice was
a “traditional exercise of the court’s authority to control its
docket.”201
This is a less direct version of the situation in Brown. There,
legislatures and judiciaries adopted the same rule. In the case of
asbestos litigation, legislatures and judiciaries took different actions (medical criteria laws and managing cases, respectively)
that had the same result.
As with court-ordered legal services, this multiplicity of
means suggests that we should not automatically distinguish
between procedure set through court rules and procedure set
through other means when considering the applicability of the
Takings Clause. If we apply the Takings Clause only to rules,
judicial actors could use strategic docket management to reach
the same result. For instance, in California’s case, courts could
have simply deferred hearing eviction cases until after the pandemic. A primary motivation behind the regulatory takings doctrine is preventing the government from circumventing its obligations. Thus, we should consider all procedure—regardless of
the means through which it is promulgated—to be a potential
taking. That does not mean that every pro bono requirement or
delay will necessarily violate the Takings Clause. Rather, instead
of using the separation of powers to limit the Takings Clause’s
reach, we can adjust the test for when a taking has occurred.
IV. CAN PROCEDURE REALLY TAKE?
Parts II and III offer some functional reasons for applying
the Takings Clause to court procedure, but they do not address a
more fundamental question: Can procedure really “take”? In
198

Id. at 276.
Behrens, supra note 196, at 524.
200 See, e.g., Third Amended Order Governing Asbestos Deferred Registry, In re Asbestos Cases, No. 98L00000 ¶1 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 1998).
201 In re Cuyahoga Cnty. Asbestos Cases, 713 N.E.2d 20, 25 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) abrogated on other grounds by Ackison v. Anchor Packing Co., 897 N.E.2d 1118 (Ohio 2008).
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Brown, the Court found there was no taking in violation of the
Fifth Amendment.202 As for Emergency Rule 1, similar eviction
moratoria enacted by legislatures and executives have consistently survived takings challenges.203 While some state courts
have found that mandatory representation schemes can violate
state constitutions, the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly rejected
claims that such a system violates the federal Takings Clause.204
Even assuming that the functional reasons are convincing, “[i]f the
courts lack the power to ‘take’ within the meaning of the Takings
Clause, their decisions obviously cannot give rise to takings
claims.”205
The question of whether procedure can “take” will necessarily
depend on our definition of takings. In the context of whether
taxes can be takings, Professor Calvin Massey notes, “Surely an
income tax of 100% imposed on a single individual—for example,
Bill Gates—would violate the Takings Clause. If that is so, then
the problem becomes a matter of degree.”206 How do we distinguish
between matters of degree within judicial-procedure takings?
Court procedure will at least occasionally lead to results that, in
other contexts, would be analyzed under the takings framework.
When will these procedures—if ever—be takings?
Numerous articles and court decisions have analyzed if and
when requiring attorneys to perform legal services could constitute a taking.207 Courts and scholars have had no difficulty applying the existing takings framework to these requirements—
even though the judiciary was the branch that was acting. This
Comment argues that such cases should properly be considered
judicial takings cases. The fact that these claims could fit so easily within the existing framework suggests that the doctrine of
judicial takings may not be as disruptive as some scholars suggest. Given the existing literature, an additional analysis of
202

Brown, 538 U.S. at 240.
See, e.g., Elmsford Apartment Assocs., LLC v. Cuomo, 469 F. Supp. 3d 148, 162–
68 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
204 See United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 635 (9th Cir. 1965); Scheehle, 508 F.3d
at 889. The D.C. Circuit seemed to leave the possibility of takings claims open for mandatory representation schemes. See Fam. Div. Trial Laws. of Superior Ct.–D.C., Inc. v.
Moultrie, 725 F.2d 695, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
205 Echeverria, supra note 94, at 487. Echeverria was discussing eminent domain
specifically.
206 Calvin R. Massey, Takings and Progressive Rate Taxation, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 85, 104 (1996).
207 See, e.g., Green, supra note 146, at 383–90; Shapiro, supra note 146, at 771–84;
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whether mandatory representation requirements could constitute takings is not necessary in this Comment.
It is less clear whether delays in hearing a case—resulting
from, for instance, Emergency Rule 1 or strategic docket management—could be a taking. To that end, Part IV.A first responds to a threshold concern, arguing that legal claims involving an underlying property right are themselves a form of
property subject to the Takings Clause. Part IV.B then explores
three themes running through the Court’s takings jurisprudence: an emphasis on the form of the burden placed on property
owners, a focus on fairness and justice, and a concern about extending takings liability so far that it interferes with government functioning. With these themes in mind, Part IV.B then
proposes two additions to the takings test: intent and aggregation. Finally, Part IV.C briefly addresses the concern that it
would be problematic to force other branches to pay for judicialprocedure takings. This Section suggests that the judiciary is responsive to political concerns and that it can adequately be kept
in check by the legislature.
A. Is There a Property Right Involved?
In analyzing takings claims, courts have suggested that the
inquiry proceeds in two steps: “First, is the subject matter . . .
‘property’ within the meaning of the fifth amendment? Second,
if so, has there been a taking of that property?”208 In looking to
judicial-procedure takings, we have to contend with the question of what kind of property right (if any) is involved. In some
cases, that might be clear: in Brown, for instance, the property
at stake was the interest on clients’ funds.209 In the case of required representation, the attorneys’ labor may be a form of
property under the Fifth Amendment.210 In cases where the procedure somehow delays a case—as in the case of California’s
Emergency Rule 1—the property right is less obvious.
This Section first addresses ambiguity in the case law about
whether a Fifth Amendment property right inheres in a legal
claim. It then argues that the Takings Clause should apply to
legal claims that relate to an underlying property interest—for
instance, where the claim is based on a contract or a tort
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involving property.211 This is consistent with both the text and
the function of the Takings Clause. Finally, this Section
responds to arguments that mere delays in legal cases cannot
implicate the Takings Clause.
There is some precedent to suggest that at least some legal
claims, especially contract claims, can give rise to a property
right under the Fifth Amendment. In the takings context, courts
have readily acknowledged that property rights exist in certain
kinds of contract claims. In the case of legislative and executive
eviction moratoria, courts have understood that contracts—for
instance, contracts that permit a landlord to evict a tenant in
certain circumstances—can create property rights.212 The focus
in these cases is not the first step of the inquiry, but the second—whether there was a taking of that property.
Courts have distinguished contract and tort claims without
fully clarifying whether tort claims are also a form of property
under the Fifth Amendment. In In re Consolidated United States
Atmospheric Testing Litigation,213 the Ninth Circuit considered
this difference.214 The suit arose out of claims for personal injury
and wrongful death resulting from the United States’ nuclear
weapons testing program.215 The opinion addressed whether
there was a taking when Congress enacted a statute providing
that the sole remedy for such injuries was through a suit against
the United States rather than a suit against private contractors.216 The court at first seemed to suggest that there was no
vested property right in a tort claim for damages until there was
a final judgment.217 It then pivoted, noting that “a cause of action
is considered to be a species of property.”218 The court then applied
the Penn Central test to hold that there was no taking: it found
that tort claims, unlike contract claims, lacked investmentbacked expectations.219 Thus, despite its initial suggestion that a
tort claim might not be property under the Fifth Amendment,
the Ninth Circuit’s decision ultimately came down to the second

211 Trespass, nuisance, conversion, and property damage are examples of torts involving a property interest.
212 Elmsford Apartment Assocs., 469 F. Supp. 3d at 162.
213 820 F.2d 982 (9th Cir. 1987).
214 Id. at 989.
215 Id. at 983–84.
216 Id. at 988–89.
217 Id. at 989.
218 In re Consol. U.S. Atmospheric, 820 F.2d at 989.
219 Id.
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step of the analysis, indicating that at least some form of property right may inhere in a tort claim.
More recently, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
considered a similar claim. In Alimanestianu v. United States,220
family members of a U.S. citizen killed in a Libyan-statesponsored terrorist attack received a $1.297 billion nonfinal
judgment for their wrongful death claim against Libya.221 The
United States subsequently entered into a settlement agreement
with Libya, obtained vacatur of the family’s judgment, and distributed a lesser amount to the family based on that settlement.222 The family sued, alleging that the settlement was a taking.223 The court assumed, without deciding, that the family had
a “cognizable property interest in their district court claims and
non-final judgment.”224 The court then turned to the second part
of the test, applied Penn Central, and found that there was no
taking.225
Rather than simply distinguishing between tort and contract
claims, there is another option. This Comment proposes that we
distinguish between claims where there is an underlying property
right and claims where there is not. The text of the Takings
Clause allows the government to take “private property” for
public use.226 Textually, then, we should apply the Takings Clause
to legal claims that involve some form of property.227
This interpretation is supported by policy reasons as well.
As noted in Part I.B, the Takings Clause is a form of liability
rule, whereas other clauses in the Constitution are property
rules. As a reminder, under a liability rule, a person can undertake an action so long as they compensate those affected. Under
a property rule, the person is simply prohibited from taking that
action. Causes of action relating to underlying property rights
can be managed through liability rules because the underlying
subject (property) can be taken under the Fifth Amendment so
long as just compensation is paid. Causes of action involving
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other kinds of rights require stronger constraints—i.e., property
rules—to avoid arbitrary deprivations of those rights.
Even assuming there is a property right in certain lawsuits,
attorneys Mark Behrens and Manuel López argue that there can
be no takings claim based on a delay in hearing a suit because a
plaintiff does not have “a property interest in the resolution of
his or her lawsuit quickly or by a particular date.”228 This concern, however, is misplaced: existing precedent suggests a willingness, in some circumstances, to consider temporary delays as
potential takings. In these cases, the Supreme Court has not
analyzed whether the plaintiff has a property right in having a
result within a specified time frame. Instead, it considered the
delay as a factor in the second step of its analysis, which determines whether there was a taking at all.
In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency,229 for instance, the Court considered whether
a moratorium on development constituted a per se taking of
property.230 The Tahoe Regional Planning Agency adopted two
directives that imposed a 32-month moratorium on development
in Lake Tahoe.231 The plaintiffs claimed that the moratorium
amounted to a per se taking.232 The Court declined to adopt a per
se rule, finding that such claims were better analyzed under the
multifactor balancing test from Penn Central.233 The Court noted,
“In rejecting petitioners’ per se rule, we do not hold that the
temporary nature of a land-use restriction precludes finding that
it effects a taking; we simply recognize that it should not be given
exclusive significance one way or the other.”234 It continued: “[T]he
duration of the restriction is one of the important factors that a
court must consider in the appraisal of a regulatory takings
claim.”235 Thus, the Court did not reject the plaintiffs’ claims
because they could not show that they had a property right to
development within a certain timeframe. Rather, the Court
assumed that there was a property right involved and analyzed
the nature of the delay under the second step of the inquiry. This
is fatal to Behrens and López’s argument: it does not matter that
228
229
230
231
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233
234
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plaintiffs do not have a property right in having their case resolved in a specific timeframe, so long as some kind of property
right is involved. Moreover, Tahoe-Sierra explicitly acknowledged that temporary delays could constitute takings under
Penn Central.236
Though Behren and López’s specific concern can be dismissed, the question of when a Fifth Amendment property right
inheres in legal claims is not developed in the case law. The exact nature of that property right may also have important implications for the compensation due after the reviewing court finds
that there has been a judicial-procedure taking. Though there
are some difficulties in evaluating the just compensation due for
a legal claim, recent scholarship suggests that the difficulties
are not insurmountable.237
Scholars’ hesitance to accept that a Fifth Amendment property right inheres in any legal claim seems partially motivated
by practical concerns. Behrens and López argue that applying
the Takings Clause to court delays would be “remarkably unworkable” given the frequency of such delays.238 Such an approach, they argue, “would set an awkward precedent that
would call into question everyday scheduling decisions of the
trial courts.”239 But diminishing the property right in all legal
claims is not the only solution to this problem. Instead, we can
focus on the second step of the inquiry and look for ways to cabin
our definition of takings in order to ensure the proper functioning of the courts.
B. Supplementing Penn Central
1. The existing approach to regulatory takings.
If judicial-procedure takings exist at all, many claims would
likely fall within the Penn Central category.240 As noted above, a
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See Blumenthal, supra note 227, at 412–23.
238 Behrens & López, supra note 187, at 298.
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240 Scholars disagree over whether Stop the Beach would establish a new per se rule
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plaintiff would likely claim that a delay in hearing a case is
functionally equivalent to a taking. The per se rules for permanent physical occupations241 and deprivations of all economically
beneficial use of the property242 have little application in this
context. Thus, these claims are properly analyzed under Penn
Central. Tahoe-Sierra suggests that a temporary delay can constitute a taking, with the length of the delay serving as an “important factor[ ]” in the court’s analysis.243 The next Section explains Penn Central and offers two ways to supplement its test
for judicial-procedure takings: intent and aggregation.
In analyzing the Court’s takings jurisprudence, three relevant themes emerge. First, as discussed in Part I.B, the Court is
concerned with the fairness and justice of the burdens placed on
property owners. Second, the form of the burden matters. Third,
the Court has acknowledged the practical impact of its decisions,
limiting the reach of its holdings to try to ensure the continued
functioning of government.
The first theme is an emphasis on fairness and justice. As
noted in Part I.B, the Court’s takings jurisprudence aims to prevent the government from forcing certain property owners to
bear public burdens “which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole.”244 In doing so, the Takings
Clause forces the government to spread the cost of certain regulations across society rather than singling out certain property
owners.
The second theme is a focus on the form of the burden. In
Lingle, the Court emphasized that the doctrine of regulatory
takings “aims to identify regulatory actions that are functionally
equivalent to the classic taking in which government directly
appropriates private property or ousts the owner from his domain.”245 Under this functional equivalence approach, the form
of the burden is important. As the Court noted in Penn Central,
it is less likely to find a taking when interference with property
rights “arises from some public program adjusting the benefits
and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.”246 In
have little applicability in the area of judicial-procedure takings because, in setting
procedure, courts are not declaring that an established property right no longer exists.
241 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 425–26 (1982).
242 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
243 Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 342.
244 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
245 Id. at 539.
246 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
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contrast, it is more likely to find a taking if there is a “physical
invasion.”247 When the physical invasion is permanent, such an
invasion “eviscerates” the right to exclude, a fundamental property interest.248 As such, any permanent physical invasion—even
if it is minimal—is a per se taking.249 Thus, the form of the burden matters in determining if there has been a taking.
The third theme is a concern with the government’s continued functioning. The Court has explained that “government regulation—by definition—involves the adjustment of rights for the
public good,” and these adjustments often result in economic
loss.250 If the Takings Clause required compensation in all these
circumstances, the government could “hardly could go on.”251
Tahoe-Sierra demonstrates the way in which the Court has
tried to strike a balance between the need for regulation and the
requirement of compensation in certain circumstances. There,
the Court declined—in part due to these practical concerns—to
adopt a per se rule finding that certain temporary development
moratoria constituted a taking.252 The Court noted, “A rule that
required compensation for every delay in the use of property
would render routine government processes prohibitively expensive or encourage hasty decisionmaking.”253 The Court then considered and rejected “narrower [per se] rule[s]” that would have
excluded “normal delays associated with processing permits” or
that applied only to delays of more than one year, respectively.254
The Court found that even these rules would seriously hamper
the planning process because temporary building moratoria are
“an essential tool of successful development.”255 The Court ultimately found that these practical concerns could be best mitigated by applying Penn Central rather than adopting a per
se rule.256
With these three themes in mind—fairness, form, and the
government’s continued functioning—we can think about how to
supplement the Penn Central test for judicial-procedure takings.
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2. Supplementing the analysis: looking to intent.
Intuitively, we might think there is a difference between
California’s Emergency Rule 1 and other judiciaries’ emergency
orders. In New York, for instance, the court’s closure was part of
an effort to mitigate the effects of the pandemic on court staff,
officers, and visitors.257 In California, meanwhile, Emergency
Rule 1 was motivated, in part, by a desire to halt evictions
themselves. Under the character factor of Penn Central, we can
distinguish between these situations by considering whether the
judiciary intended to use a particular property for public ends.
Where the intent is present, that should weigh in favor of finding a taking.
Professors Eduardo Peñalver and Lior Strahilevitz first proposed the idea that we should focus on intent in analyzing judicial takings in the context of changes to the common law of
property.258 In cases where there is no dispute over whether a
taking has occurred—for instance, in most eminent domain
cases—the “public use” inquiry serves to limit the government’s
ends.259 But, in the regulatory takings context, Peñalver and
Strahilevitz suggest that we can use the public use inquiry to
decide whether a taking has occurred in the first place.260 Thus,
when the judiciary has the intent to seize private property in order
to achieve a legitimate public end, the Takings Clause is the proper
framework.261 The presence of an intention to seize property for
public use “marks off the ‘takings’ subset of the broader category
of property losses due to intentional actions of the State (deprivations), a subset that the Fifth Amendment explicitly declares
to be legitimate, provided that just compensation is paid.”262 The
presence of this intent, then, can help us determine if a taking
has occurred.
Peñalver and Strahilevitz further refine their theory by distinguishing between two kinds of intent: “intentionally submitting property to public use” and “incidentally imposing property
losses on particular owners as a result of changes in property

257 Procedures to Mitigate the Effects of the COVID-19 Outbreak on the Unified
Court System, AO/68/20 (Mar. 16, 2020), https://perma.cc/CUJ6-CRAR.
258 Eduardo M. Peñalver & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Judicial Takings or Due Process?, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 305, 322 (2012).
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law (albeit changes intentionally undertaken . . . for public reasons).”263 We can identify the first category “by asking whether a
particular property owner’s loss is itself a means of achieving
the relevant public end.”264 In both cases, the losses are motivated
by a public purpose, but it is only in the former case that particular property is intentionally used for a public end.265 In the latter
case, the loss is merely an “unintended consequence” of a larger
change in property law.266 The former category is properly evaluated under a judicial takings rubric; the latter is not.267
This approach is also somewhat consistent with scattered
suggestions in the Court’s jurisprudence on delays. In rejecting
the proposed per se rule in Tahoe-Sierra (the development moratoria case), the Court noted that “even the weak version of petitioners’ categorical rule would treat these interim measures as
takings regardless of the good faith of the planners.”268 The
Court thus implicitly suggested that good faith can help us distinguish between noncompensable government action and takings.
Good faith is slightly different from an intent to single out: a
government official may, in good faith, enact a regulation that
the official believes serves an important public purpose, while
still singling out a specific subset of property owners to bear the
regulatory burden.269 Nonetheless, this language suggests that
the motives of the government might matter.
Applying this framework to the judiciaries’ limits on evictions, California’s Emergency Rule 1 is a prototypical action for
the judicial takings framework. In limiting the procedural remedy of evictions, the Judicial Council targeted a particular subset of property owners (landlords) as the means of achieving a
public end, assisting tenants and keeping them in the “homes
they have been instructed to remain in.”270
This is distinct from New York’s rule: the chief administrative judge suspended evictions as part of a larger effort to mitigate the effects of COVID-19 “upon the users, visitors, staff, and
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judicial officers of the Unified Court System.”271 Thus, the court
seemed indifferent to the particular property owners affected.
Even though the goal of New York’s order—mitigating the effects
of COVID-19—might be thought of as a public purpose, the fact
that landlords could not evict tenants was an unintended byproduct and therefore should not constitute a taking.
Juxtaposing the California and New York rules demonstrates
why we cannot focus exclusively on the economic burdens faced
by property owners. The burdens on landlords in New York might
be identical to the burdens on landlords in California. But the
situations are distinct: In California, there was an intent to single out a particular set of property owners. In New York, the judiciary halted all nonessential proceedings; it was indifferent to
the way in which the delay affected tenants and landlords specifically. Singling out is a primary motivation for the Takings
Clause, so the existence of that intent makes it more likely that
California’s rule should be a taking.
It is important to remember that intent only supplements
the analysis. Under the other Penn Central factors, Emergency
Rule 1 alone is likely not a taking: the rule was in effect for only
five months,272 landlords were still owed rent, and landlordtenant relationships have historically been heavily regulated,
meaning that a five-month eviction moratorium likely did not
significantly interfere with investment-backed expectations.273
That said, depending on the length of the delay, an eviction
moratorium could be a taking. The recent cases upholding eviction
moratoria all involved moratoria lasting only a few months: the
case upholding New York’s moratoria was decided a few months
after it was put into place;274 a Massachusetts moratorium upheld

271 Procedures to Mitigate the Effects of the COVID-19 Outbreak on the Unified
Court System, AO/68/20.
272 See Ashley M. Peterson, Judicial Council Votes to End Emergency Rules 1 & 2,
CAL. LAWS. ASSOC., https://perma.cc/SA4Q-LJHC.
273 Cf. Baptiste v. Kennealy, No. 1:20-CV-11335, 2020 WL 5751572, at *22 (D. Mass.
Sept. 25, 2020). In general, landlords face an uphill battle in establishing that limits on
evictions are takings because courts do not consider each individual unit to be a separate
piece of property. See Elmsford Apartment Assocs., 469 F. Supp. 3d at 166. In analyzing
the economic impact of the regulation, courts consider the regulation’s impact on the
building as a whole. See id. In Elmsford, for instance, the court suggested that the plaintiffs would need to demonstrate that the moratorium made it “‘commercially impracticable’ for them to operate their buildings as a whole” to succeed on an as-applied challenge
under the Takings Clause. Id. (quoting Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis,
480 U.S. 470, 496 (1987)).
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by another federal court lasted just six months.275 California’s
limits on evictions, meanwhile, last (at the time of this writing)
through September 2021—over one year from the enactment of
Emergency Rule 1.276 A landlord may commence an action to recover COVID-19 rental debt, as defined by law, only starting
November 1, 2021.277 It is possible that a landlord could succeed
on an as-applied challenge to these restrictions under the Takings
Clause. In analyzing the as-applied challenge, this Comment argues that the reviewing court should consider the legislature’s
and the judiciary’s limits on evictions together—rather than
considering the legislature’s limits in isolation.
Intent can supplement the analysis, but intent alone is insufficient. For one, the Court has shown a distaste for analyzing
intent in the context of court procedure. In Shady Grove
Orthopedic Associates, P. A. v. Allstate Insurance Co.,278 a case
concerning a potential conflict between a New York statute and
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court rejected the
notion that it should use “the subjective intentions of the state
legislature” to determine whether the state law and federal rule
conflicted.279 The Court noted, “Many laws further more than
one aim, and the aim of others may be impossible to discern.”280
Moreover, “federal judges would be condemned to poring
through state legislative history—which may be less easily obtained, less thorough, and less familiar than its federal counterpart.”281 Equivalent history for court procedure is likely even less
accessible, if it exists at all.
And it can be problematic to allow the government to escape
liability by offering the proper reasons for its delay. In a different context, Justice Scalia noted that allowing the government
to escape liability by offering a specified reason “amounts to a
test of whether the legislature has a stupid staff.”282 As such, the
focus on intent may serve as one convincing factor in analyzing
whether a procedure is a taking, but it should not be dispositive.
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3. Looking to aggregation.
The Supreme Court has held that the doctrine of regulatory
takings is meant to identify actions that are “functionally equivalent to the classic taking,” meaning the form of the burden matters.283 As we consider judicial-procedure takings, we can look to
form too. There might be procedural changes that (1) have severe
economic burdens and interfere with distinct investment-backed
expectations (the first two factors under Penn Central) and
(2) are motivated by an intent to affect one set of parties (our
singling-out concern). Yet these changes might still fail to be
functionally equivalent to a classic taking.
Unimpaired asbestos dockets offer one example. There, the
court is intentionally prioritizing the lawsuits of an identifiable
group (sick plaintiffs) while delaying the suits of another group
(those with no medically cognizable impairment). One might
argue that the property loss—to the extent there is one—is
unintentional in that the court is merely choosing to prioritize
cases with sick plaintiffs, so any delay for the others is just an
unintentional byproduct. One could just as easily argue the delay is intentional: courts are conscious of the fact that “there is
not enough money available from traditional defendants to pay
for current and future claims,”284 so they are attempting to preserve resources for the most deserving plaintiffs at the expense
of the less deserving. There is, at the very least, a plausible argument that the court is singling out unimpaired asbestos plaintiffs through docket management. But courts—and the government—are engaged in acts allocating limited resources all the
time, and that should not necessarily raise the specter of takings. And we have to keep in mind the third theme in the
Court’s takings jurisprudence: allowing the government to continue to function.
Professor Lee Fennell proposes a “different way to pour content into the judicial-takings doctrine.”285 Fennell suggests that
the takings framework is appropriate when judicial actions
“transform[ ]” distinct property interests through aggregation.286
A clear example of aggregation is eminent domain.287 Through
283
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eminent domain, other political branches “reconfigur[e] sets of
rights into larger and more valuable configurations.”288 For instance, the government may assemble small parcels of land together to build a highway or a park that benefits the community
as a whole.
Regulation, too, is a form of aggregation.289 It allows the
government to achieve different “regulatory assemblages” that
are more valuable than the regulated parts.290 To offer a nontakings example, the government may require that all students
in a school get vaccinated. The value of any one vaccination is
marginal to society, but, by requiring mass vaccination, the government can create herd immunity.291 This benefits everyone,
even unvaccinated students. The advantages of the vaccine requirement are greater than the sum of its parts. In the takings
context, Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.292 offers
another example of this form of aggregation. There, the government required landlords to permit a cable television company to
install cable facilities on its property to facilitate tenant access
to cable.293 This achieved a “regulatory assemblage” by allowing
everyone in the neighborhood to access cable. According to the
Court of Appeals, this access had “important educational and
community aspects,” meaning that the benefits of universal
cable outweighed the regulated parts.294
Thus, in analyzing potential judicial-procedure takings, we
should look to whether the act is aggregative—generating a surplus that we could then use to compensate the losers—or merely
allocative. This approach is consistent both with the Court’s emphasis on form as well as fairness and justice. When the court’s
procedure creates a surplus, it is fair that the court use that
surplus to compensate the losers. When there is no surplus, the
court is merely “adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic
life”295 in a world with limited resources. As Fennell argues, this
approach “dovetails with the twin goals of allowing courts to
carry out their ordinary business without interference, while
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still keeping them from undertaking acts that, if undertaken by
a political actor, would count as takings.”296
This focus on aggregation can supplement the intent analysis. With the deferred asbestos dockets, the judiciary is not engaging in an aggregative exercise; there is no surplus. Rather, it
is allocating limited resources among plaintiffs, favoring those
who have the most serious need (the sick). Under this analysis,
the deferred asbestos dockets should not constitute a taking.
In contrast, the IOLTA program from Brown might be considered a taking: the program targeted funds that could not generate net interest on their own and required that attorneys put
those funds into accounts that could generate interest.297 The judiciary then used this interest to fund legal services for the
“needy” (a public purpose).298 This could constitute a taking.
(There, however, the court found that there were no “losers,” so
no compensation was necessary.)299
COVID-19 eviction moratoria—whether enacted by the executive, legislative, or judicial branch—also have an element of
aggregation. Eviction moratoria can serve as a public health
measure. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention suggest that such moratoria can prevent overcrowding in homeless
shelters and other shared living spaces and limit interstate
transmission because tenants do not need to move across state
lines to live with family.300 This is akin to the vaccine example:
the moratoria create a regulatory surplus by preventing the exponential spread of disease. This should weigh in favor of finding that the moratoria are a taking.
Combining intent and aggregation under the character factor
of Penn Central is a way to cabin the reach of judicial-procedure
takings. It is responsive to the emphasis on form and fairness,
while also allowing the government to continue to function.
C. Who Pays?
There is one final concern to address in the context of judicial takings: the question of just compensation. The judiciary
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does not have the power of the purse, so it may seem problematic to force the other branches to pay for judicial takings. As
Professors Frederic Bloom and Christopher Serkin put it, under
the judicial takings doctrine, “courts can pry open a state’s coffers and face little political reprisal when they do.”301 They argue
that this concern is real but also that it is “easy to overstate.”302
For one, judges are not entirely politically insulated. Elected
judges are an obvious example, but a substantial body of scholarship demonstrates that even unelected judges respond to political pressures.303 Bloom and Serkin also note that courts already
“open state coffers elsewhere,” in the cases of educational reform
litigation, tort claims against government actors, and, of course,
classic regulatory takings cases.304
Legislatures also have an array of tools to affect judicial decision-making. They may withhold court funding or threaten to
pack the court.305 In the case of judicial-procedure takings, legislatures, in most cases, may enact substantive laws to override
the promulgated procedure. Even in states that give power to
the judiciary to enact rules, there is often an option for legislative override.306 The issue of who pays the just compensation due
under the Takings Clause is not unique to judicial-procedure
takings. It is implicated in all judicial takings, and there is reason to think that this problem alone is not insurmountable.
CONCLUSION
In Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Stop the Beach, he
warned against establishing a doctrine of judicial takings because “the Takings Clause implicitly recognizes a governmental
power while placing limits upon that power.”307 There might be
some cases, however, where we think the judiciary should have
the authority to take actions that, in other contexts, would be
analyzed under the Takings Clause. The Introduction of this
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Comment defined procedure as “the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction
of them.”308 In justly administering the law, we may want courts
to have the flexibility to take the needs of society into account.
This might include limiting evictions during a pandemic, appointing counsel for indigent litigants, or intentionally prioritizing the most injured plaintiffs in asbestos litigation. At the very
least, we should uphold the principles of federalism by acknowledging that states may give their courts more leeway to enact
procedures that would otherwise seem legislative. In doing so,
states can serve as laboratories of democracy,309 and we can
learn from the various ways of allocating power among the
branches of government.
Applying the Takings Clause to these procedures “implicitly
recognizes [the courts’] power while placing limits upon that
power.”310 The Due Process Clause, in contrast, would simply
limit the judiciaries’ authority. And doing nothing might create
an incentive for the legislature to funnel its potential takings
through the judiciary.
It may seem unlikely that this extension of the Takings
Clause will have significant effects in practice. Despite the uproar following Stop the Beach, courts have rarely, if ever, found
that a judicial action is a taking. Given the difficulty in proving
a violation of the Takings Clause, it is hard to identify a procedure that will invariably mandate compensation. So much depends on the “ad hoc” Penn Central test, the specific circumstances of the case, and the judicial actor’s authority under
either the state or federal constitution. What this Comment argues, then, may seem theoretical.
Or not. Outside of judicial takings, regulatory takings are
exceedingly rare, but the doctrine still has value. The cases in
which a court finds a regulatory taking are significant, and the
doctrine enables compensation. The doctrine may also have
some deterrent effect on government. Likewise, the doctrine of
judicial-procedure takings—even if such takings are rare—may
encourage the judiciary to better internalize the costs of its
308

Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 407 (quoting Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14).
See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310–11 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
310 Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 736 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
309

2021]

Can Procedure Take?

1923

decisions. Rather than adopting a categorical rule holding that
procedure could never constitute a taking, we should allow
plaintiffs to make their case by demonstrating that the procedure represents an unfair burden—one that, “in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.” 311
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